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Abstract
Face recognition technology has demonstrated tremen-
dous progress over the past few years, primarily due to
advances in representation learning. As we witness the
widespread adoption of these systems, it is imperative to
consider the security of face representations. In this pa-
per, we explore the practicality of using a fully homomor-
phic encryption based framework to secure a database of
face templates. This framework is designed to preserve
the privacy of users and prevent information leakage from
the templates, while maintaining their utility through tem-
plate matching directly in the encrypted domain. Addi-
tionally, we also explore a batching and dimensionality re-
duction scheme to trade-off face matching accuracy and
computational complexity. Experiments on benchmark face
datasets (LFW, IJB-A, IJB-B, CASIA) indicate that secure
face matching can be practically feasible (16 KB template
size and 0.01 sec per match pair for 512-dimensional fea-
tures from SphereFace [23]) while exhibiting minimal loss
in matching performance.
1. Introduction
Face recognition is the science of determining the iden-
tity of people through their characteristic facial appearance.
Being the primary modality for human identification, this
topic has received tremendous attention in the pattern recog-
nition and biometrics communities. There has been a steady
improvement in face recognition accuracy over the past few
decades, much of which can be attributed to deep learn-
ing over the last few years. Thanks to progress in learning
feature representations, automated face recognition systems
are now believed to surpass human performance in some
scenarios [25]. As a result, face recognition technology is
witnessing wide spread adoption in numerous applications,
such as surveillance systems, social media and law enforce-
ment. However, the increased deployment of such technol-
ogy also makes it an attractive target of malicious attacks.
A typical face recognition system acquires a facial
image, which undergoes some pre-processing, following
which high-dimensional features are extracted. During en-
rollment, these features vectors are stored in a database
along with their identity labels. This database is then used
to verify a person’s claimed identity (face verification) or
determine a person’s identity (face identification).
One of the simplest and foremost points of attack on a
face recognition system is the database of face templates.
Directly storing the facial feature vectors in the database can
significantly compromise the privacy of the enrolled users
and the security of the authentication system. For instance,
it has been demonstrated recently that access to the repre-
sentations can enable the reconstruction of a user’s original
facial image [26] by a malicious attacker. The reconstructed
face images were shown to be of sufficient quality to be
successfully matched by a state-of-the-art face recognition
system. Similarly, soft facial attributes such as age, gen-
der, ethnicity etc. can be predicted with high accuracy from
facial features [24]. Therefore, it is imperative to devise
techniques to prevent information leakage from face rep-
resentations while preserving face matching performance,
thereby preventing attacks of this nature. Addressing this
problem is the central aim of this paper.
An attractive solution for secure face matching is the
use of cryptosystems to protect the face template database
and perform matching over encrypted data. These meth-
ods, however, have not found much traction in the biomet-
rics and pattern recognition community. Generic encryp-
tion schemes are inherently incapable of supporting basic
arithmetic operations, necessary for template matching, di-
rectly in the encrypted domain. On the other hand, homo-
morphic cryptosystems are a special class of cryptosystems
that allow basic arithmetic operations over encrypted data
[12]. These systems can be broadly categorized into three
classes, (1) partially homomorphic encryption systems that
support only a single arithmetic operation i.e., either addi-
tion [30] or multiplication [10] in the encrypted domain, (2)
somewhat homomorphic encryption systems that support a
limited number of both additions and multiplications, and
(3) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) systems that sup-
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port unlimited additions and multiplications directly in the
encrypted domain. These systems offer a trade-off between
generalization and computational complexity. Ergo, while
the latter are more general they are significantly more com-
putationally demanding than the former systems.
In this paper, we present a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion [13] based approach to (1) cryptographically secure the
database of face templates and the feature vector of the pre-
sented face image, and (2) perform matching directly in
the encrypted domain without the need for decrypting the
templates. We leverage the observation that a typical face
matching metric, either Euclidean distance or cosine simi-
larity, can be decomposed into its constituent series of addi-
tion and multiplication operations. Both of these operations
are supported by FHE schemes over encrypted data. This
solution affords many benefits, including the desidarata of
template protection schemes [27]:
Diversity: Using different encryption and decryption
keys across different databases can protect against cross-
database-matching attacks. Revocability: Compromised
templates can be revoked and reissued simply by revoking
and reissuing the encryption and decryption keys. Security:
The security of the face template database is cryptograph-
ically guaranteed by the hardness of the ring learning with
errors problem [6]. This problem forms the basis of cur-
rent practical FHE schemes. Therefore, it is computation-
ally prohibitive to obtain the original face template without
the decryption key. Performance: Since homomorphic en-
cryption admits addition and multiplication of integers di-
rectly in the encrypted domain, the proposed scheme can
maintain the recognition performance, in terms of FAR and
FRR, of the face recognition system. Privacy: The inabil-
ity to access the original face template without the decryp-
tion keys helps preserve the privacy of the users, preventing
estimation of either the original image [26] or any soft bio-
metric traits [24].
The key technical barrier to realizing homomorphic en-
cryption based face matching is the computational com-
plexity of homomorphic encryption, especially homomor-
phic multiplication. This limitation renders it unsuitable for
tasks that need to operate on high-dimensional vectors. For
instance, we consider face representations that are hundreds
to thousands of dimensions, thereby necessitating as many
costly homomorphic operations. A straight-forward appli-
cation of FHE for face matching needs 48.7 MB of memory
for each 512-dimensional encrypted face template and 12.8
secs for matching a single pair of such templates [46].
The primary contributions of this paper are geared to-
wards addressing this limitation: (1) Utilize a more effi-
cient FHE scheme, namely Fan-Vercauteren [11], easing
the computational burden to 16.5 MB of memory and 0.6
secs per pair of templates. These requirements could still be
prohibitive for practical deployment. (2) Utilize a batching
scheme that allows homomorphic multiplication of multiple
values at the cost of a single homomorphic multiplication.
This scheme reduces the computational requirements to, 16
KB memory per template and 0.01 secs to match a pair of
templates. (2) Dimensionality reduction to further provide
a trade-off between computational efficiency and matching
performance.
2. Related Work
Cryptographic Biometric Template Protection: A num-
ber of approaches have been proposed to bring together bio-
metric authentication and traditional cryptography. Soutar
et al. [42, 43] proposed one of the earliest systems for bio-
metric encryption of fingerprints. The idea of using visual
cryptography [29] on raw biometric data was also explored
in the context of fingerprint images [34], iris templates [36]
and face images [37]. This method ensures biometric pri-
vacy while maintaining the ability to match biometric im-
ages. Fuzzy vault [19] based approaches have been pro-
posed for biometric authentication in the context of finger-
print [47] and iris [22] patterns. These methods allow for
matching inexact biometric templates in the encrypted do-
main. However, unlike the proposed FHE solution, they are
not designed to maintain full utility (performance wise) of
the encrypted biometrics.
Pattern-Recognition Based Biometric Template Protec-
tion: Instead of relying on the security afforded by cryp-
tographic systems, a number of pattern recognition based
approaches have been proposed for biometric template pro-
tection. Davida et al. [9] and Radha et al. [35] proposed
non-invertible transformation functions to protect biomet-
ric signatures. Cancelable biometrics [32] are another ap-
proach for the same purpose while allowing for revocability
and diversity of templates. Key-binding systems [28, 4] se-
cure a biometric template by monolithically binding it with
a secret key. The readers are encouraged to refer to the ex-
cellent article by Jain et al. [18] for a more comprehensive
treatment of this topic. All the aforementioned approaches,
however, trade-off security and matching performance i.e.,
they either suffer significant loss in matching accuracy or
do not provide adequate template protection. In contrast,
the FHE based scheme explored here does not suffer from
this trade-off and can offer high levels of template protec-
tion without adversely sacrificing matching performance.
Homomorphic Encryption for Biometrics: The primary
attraction of homomorphic encryption is the ability to per-
form basic arithmetic operations such as additions and mul-
tiplications in the encrypted domain. Initial homomorphic
encryption [16] driven biometric authentication approaches
[21, 3] were largely based on partial homomorphic encryp-
tion (PHE) schemes and in the context of matching bina-
rized templates. Upmanyu et al. [48, 49] proposed a bio-
...
Detection Alignment Normalization Embedding Function Representation
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Figure 1: A typical face representation pipeline comprises of face detection, alignment, normalization and feature extraction.
The embedding function maps a high-dimensional normalized face image to a d-dimensional vector representation.
metric matching system based on a PHE scheme. This
scheme required repeated rounds of communication be-
tween the client and the database to compute the match
score, suffering from large communication overhead and
computational complexity. Barni et al. [1, 2] leverage a
Paillier cryptosystem, a PHE system that supports addition
over encrypted data. This system was used for matching fin-
gerprints using fingercode templates where the probe is en-
crypted while the database remains unencrypted, providing
no security to the fingerprint database. Penn et al. [33] also
leverage a Paillier cryptosystem [30] for matching binary
iris templates. Recently, Cheon et al. [7] proposed Ghost-
shell, a secure biometric authentication scheme for match-
ing 2048-bit binary iris templates in the encrypted domain.
It relied on a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme,
requiring about 0.5s per match pair. However, these ap-
proaches are specific to matching binary bit strings and can-
not maintain the same computational and algorithmic char-
acteristics when extended to real valued face templates.
The development of fully homomorphic encryption by
Gentry et al. [15] has led to the promise of statistical analy-
sis over encrypted data. In the context of biometric match-
ing, Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. [46] proposed a FHE based
face verification system using Gabor features. Their sys-
tem was based on early an FHE scheme [14] that was com-
putationally expensive (template size of 380 MB and 100
secs per match pair) and did not take full advantage of the
specific nature of the face matching problem. In contrast,
this paper proposes a secure face matching scheme that sig-
nificantly improves the computational efficiency over en-
crypted templates (template size of 66 KB and 0.01 sec per
match pair). We leverage the Fan-Vercauteren scheme [11],
a more efficient FHE scheme, and a batching scheme that al-
lows homomorphic multiplication of multiple numbers for
the cost of a single homomorphic multiplication.
Face Recognition: There is a vast body of work devoted
to studying the topic of face recognition. While an ex-
haustive survey of the literature is beyond the scope of
this paper, we present a few approaches that form the ba-
sis of our face matching system. Current state-of-the-
art face recognition approaches are based on deep neural
network based representation learning techniques. These
methods [44, 39, 31, 23] rely on end-to-end learning of
feature extraction models using convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs). The goal of this paper is to ensure secure
matching of face templates extracted from such representa-
tion models. We demonstrate the efficacy of our framework
on two different face representation models, FaceNet [39]
(128-dimensions) and SphereFace [23] (512-dimensions).
3. Approach
The goal of this paper is to explore the practicality of us-
ing fully homomorphic encryption for face matching over
encrypted face templates. First we describe the face match-
ing process and break it down to its constituent operations,
series of multiplications and additions. Then we introduce
fully homomorphic encryption and finally describe solu-
tions to mitigate the computational burden of face matching
over encrypted data.
3.1. Problem Setup
A typical face recognition system consists of a database
of face representations X = {x1, . . . ,xn} extracted from
the images of the enrolled subjects (see Fig. 1 for a pic-
torial illustration of the feature extraction process). During
deployment, a user who wishes to get authenticated pro-
vides their facial image from which a representation y is
extracted. This representation is then matched against the
templates in the database. The result of the matching pro-
cess is a score that determines the degree of dissimilarity
between y and X . The dissimilarity score between two
representations x ∈ Rd and y ∈ Rd is typically defined as,
d(x,y) = 1− x
Ty
‖x‖‖y‖ = 1− x˜
T y˜ = 1−
d∑
i=1
x˜iy˜i (1)
where x˜ = x‖x‖ is the normalized representation. Hence,
the face matching process is comprised of d scalar multipli-
cations and d scalar additions.
In this work, we seek to devise a solution to preserve the
privacy of the databaseX as well as the probe y and prevent
leakage of any private information corresponding to a user’s
Encrypted DatabaseClient Device
(E(x), c)
Key Gen
Encryptionx
θd
θe
(a) Enrollment: During this phase the user generates the key pair (θe,θd), encrypts feature vector x with the public key θe and transmits
the encrypted feature vector E(x) and the user identity c. The private key θd however remains on the client device.
Encrypted DatabaseClient Device
θe
Encryptiony
θd
Decryption(d1, . . . , dn)
(E(y), c′)
(E(d1), . . . , E(dn))
(b) Authentication: During this phase, a user seeks to get authenticated, encrypts the probe feature vector y with the public key θe and
transmits E(y) to the database along with the claimed identity c′. The database computes the dissimilarity score over encrypted features
and transmits the matching score to the client, where it is decrypted with the private key θd.
Figure 2: Enrollment and authentication protocols for secure face matching using fully homomorphic encryption.
facial appearance. This can be achieved through a parame-
terized function that transforms a face template z from the
original space into an alternate space, i.e., E(z) = f(z;θe),
where f(·;θe) is the transformation function with parame-
ters θe and z = g(E(z);θd), where g(·;θd) is the inverse
transformation function with parameters θd. While many
such transformation functions exist, the key idea of our pa-
per is to use transformation functions that can cryptographi-
cally guarantee the security of the original features z (with-
out knowledge of θd) while allowing for template matching
in the transformed space without loss of accuracy i.e.,
d(E(x), E(y)) = d(f(x,θe), f(y,θe)) ≈ d(x,y) (2)
Transformation functions that satisfy this property en-
able us to preserve the privacy of the users. Even if a mali-
cious attacker can gain access to the database of face tem-
plates, without access to the inverse transformation param-
eters θd the attacker cannot estimate the user’s facial image
or extract soft biometric attributes inherent in the template.
3.2. Enrollment and Authentication Protocols
We now describe a protocol for user enrollment and au-
thentication using the cryptographic transformation func-
tion described above. We consider a scenario with two en-
tities, a device and a database.
Enrollment: During this phase the c-th user performs the
following actions on the device; (1) generate pair of keys,
a public encryption key θce and a private decryption key θ
c
d
(each user can have their own pair of keys), (2) transmit the
public key θce to the database, (3) capture a series of images
of the face, (4) extract the representation of the acquired
face images Xc = {xc1, . . . ,xcnc} where nc is the number
of enrollment samples for the c-th user, (5) encrypt the face
images using the public key θce, and (6) and finally trans-
mit the encrypted templates to the database along with the
identity label. On the database the encrypted templates, the
public key θce and identity label are added to the database.
Figure 2a shows an illustration of this process.
Authentication: During this phase the device seeks to au-
thenticate the user through the following process: (1) the
user’s facial image is acquired following which the repre-
sentation y is extracted, (2) this representation is encrypted
using the public key θe, which can possibly be differ-
ent from θce, (3) transmit the encrypted representation, the
claimed identity (c′) and the public encryption key θe if it is
different from θce. At the database if the encryption key of
the probe is different from the encryption key of the user’s
template, the database executes key switching on the probe
without having to decrypt it, (5) compute the dissimilarity
score d(E(y), E(x)c′k ) for all the templates of the c′-th iden-
tity, (6) the encryption key of the scores are switched back
to θe, and transmitted back to the device. Finally, at the
device, the encrypted scores are decrypted using the secret
decryption key θd to verify the identity of the user. Figure
2b shows an illustration of this procedure.
3.3. Homomorphic Encryption: A Primer
We first introduce the main ideas behind the Fan-
Vercauteren [11] FHE scheme that we use and describe a
straight-forward but computationally expensive application
of this scheme to the face matching problem.
Mathematical Notation: Modular arithmetic forms the
mathematical basis of homomorphic encryption systems.
For t ∈ Z a ring Rt = Zt[x]/(xn + 1) represents polyno-
mials of degree less than n with the coefficients modulo t.
The operators b·c, d·e and b·e denote rounding down, up and
to the nearest integer respectively. The operator [·] denotes
the reduction of an integer by modulo t, where the reduc-
tions are performed on the symmetric interval [−t/2, t/2).
The operators when applied to a polynomial are assumed
to act independently on the coefficients of the polynomial.
a
$←− S denotes that a is sampled uniformly from the finite
set S. Similarly, a ←− χ denotes that a is sampled from a
discrete truncated Gaussian.
Fan-Vercauteren Scheme [11]: Any number, integer or
rational, first needs to be encoded in a ring Rt before it
can be encrypted. Similarly, the encrypted numbers are en-
coded as polynomials in the ring Rq . Let λ be the desired
level of security, w the base to represent numbers in, and
l = blogw qc the number of terms in the decomposition of q
into basew. The FV scheme utilizes three keys, (1) a private
decryption key θd, (2) a public encryption key θe, and (3)
evaluation keys θev which are necessary for multiplication
over encrypted data. Below are the details of key genera-
tion, addition and multiplication over encrypted integers.
• Gen Secret Key (λ): Sample θd $←− R2
• Gen Public Key (θd): Sample a $←− Rq and e $←− χ.
Output θe = ([−(aθd + e)]q,a)
• Gen Evaluation Key (θd,w): for i ∈ {0, . . . , l}, sample
ai
$←− Rq , ei ←− χ.
Output θev = ([−(aiθd + ei) + wiθ2d]q,ai)
• Encrypt(m, θe): For m ∈ Rt, sample u $←− R2
and e1, e2 ←− χ. Output ct = ([m + θe[0]u +
e]q, [θe[1]u+ e]q)
• Decrypt(ct, θd): Output
[⌊
t
q [ct[0] + ct[1]θd]
⌉]
• Add(ct0, ct1): Output (ct0[0]+ct1[0], ct0[1]+ct1[1])
• Multiply(ct0, ct1): Compute:
c0 =
[⌊
t
q (ct0[0]ct1[0])
⌉]
q
c1 =
[⌊
t
q (ct0[0]ct1[1] + ct0[1]ct1[0])
⌉]
q
c2 =
[⌊
t
q (ct0[1]ct1[1])
⌉]
q
c2 =
∑l
i=0 c
(i)
2 w
i and compute
c′0 = c0 +
∑l
i=1 θev[i][0]c
i
2
c′1 = c1 +
∑l
i=1 θev[i][1]c
i
2
Output (c′0, c
′
1)
The algorithm described above enables us to perform
face matching in the encrypted domain. The face dissim-
ilarity score described in Eq. 1 can be computed in the en-
crypted domain as:
d(x,y) = 1− g
(
d∑
i=1
E(xi)E(yi),θd
)
(3)
where computing the inner product over encrypted data
would necessitate d encrypted multiplications and d−1 en-
crypted additions. Since each encrypted multiplication is
computationally expensive, evaluating the face dissimilar-
ity score can be very slow [46]. This problem is further ex-
acerbated by the high dimensionality of the face templates,
typically running into hundreds to thousands of dimensions.
Addition and multiplication of two encrypted integers
translates to polynomial addition and multiplication in Rt.
As long as the coefficients of the resulting polynomials do
not exceed t and their degrees do not exceed (xn + 1), cor-
rectness is ensured and we can recover the score by evalu-
ating the polynomial at the integer base w i.e., at x = w.
3.4. Efficient Homomorphic Face Matching
While the algorithm described above can be directly uti-
lized for face matching, it suffers from high computational
requirements. Supporting computations involving many
high-precision real-values from the facial features requires
prohibitively large values of n and t. For a 512-dimensional
face template and desired security level of 128 bits, us-
ing this algorithm requires 16.5 MB of storage space for
each encrypted template and 0.6 secs for matching a pair
of such templates. We present a few different solutions
to address these limitations. First, we describe a quanti-
zation scheme to encode facial features in Rt. Then, we
describe a batching scheme for encoding a vector of real-
values into a single polynomial using the Chinese Remain-
der Theorem. This encoding allows us to amortize multiple
6 1 2 2
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Figure 3: Homomorphic computation of inner product between vectors using batching, where multiple elements are encrypted
into a single encrypted block. The batching process does not allow access to each element of the encrypted block. Therefore,
after the Hadamard product, the sum of the elements within the encrypted block can be computed through repeated cyclic
rotations and additions.
homomorphic multiplications within a single homomorphic
multiplication, thereby providing significant computational
efficiencies. Lastly, we leverage classical dimensionality re-
duction algorithms to further ease the computational burden
of homomorphic face matching.
Data Representation: The efficiency of homomorphic ad-
ditions and multiplications is critically dependent on the en-
coding scheme chosen to represent the real-valued elements
of the face template within a polynomial ringRt. The space
of ring Rt is significantly different from the space of real
values R or the space of integers Z. Hence, to maintain the
integrity of the homomorphic computations, the chosen en-
coding scheme needs to ensure that the range of values af-
ter the desired homomorphic operations remain within the
ring. Pursuantly, we encode the real-valued face features
into integers with a precision of two decimal digits and then
represent these integers in base w.
Encoding(a) = sign(a)(an−1xn−1+· · ·+a1x+a0) (4)
Accordingly, this encoding scheme can represent any inte-
ger in −(wn − 1) ≤ a ≤ (wn − 1).
Batching: The main computational bottleneck of face
matching over encrypted data is the number of homomor-
phic multiplications necessary for computing the dissimi-
larity score. Brakerski et al. [5] and Smart et al. [41] pro-
posed techniques for homomorphic encryption and decryp-
tion over an array of numbers instead of a single number at
a time. These techniques leverage the Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT) and encode multiple numbers within the
same polynomial. For instance, given the primitive 2n-th
root of unity modulo t, we have: xn + 1 = (x − ξ)(x −
ξ3) . . . (x− ξ2n−1) mod t
The CRT factorizes the ring Rt when t is chosen to be
a product of many small prime factors i.e., t =
∏k
i=1 ti,
where p1, . . . , pk are distinct prime numbers. Given these
primes, we can perform computations modulo each prime
and recover the computation with respect to the product of
the primes by using the CRT. The computations with respect
to the primes are independent of each other and hence can
be implemented in parallel.
Given two vectors x and y, the sum and Hadamard prod-
uct of the two vectors can simply be computed as element-
wise addition and multiplication, respectively, of the en-
crypted vectors. By batching k numbers into a single en-
crypted block, we can perform k homomorphic additions
or multiplications at the block level for the computational
cost of a single operation. Therefore, as the batch size gets
larger, we can realize significant computational efficiency.
The main drawback of this scheme, however, is the inability
to access the individual elements of the packed encrypted
vector. This prevents us from computing the sum of the
elements, an operation that is necessary for computing the
dissimilarity score (Eq. 3). This limitation can be addressed
by leveraging the observation made my Gentry et al. [15],
namely, it is possible to cyclically rotate the encrypted vec-
tors without the need for decryption. Therefore, the sum of
the encrypted values can be computed by cyclically rotating
and adding the encrypted vectors l = logqw times. Figure 3
and Algorithm 1 respectively provide a pictorial illustration
and algorithmic description of this process.
Algorithm 1 Homomorphic Inner Product
1: procedure ENCRYPTEDINNERPRODUCT(m,m′)
2: E(x)← f(x,θe) . CRT Encoding
3: E(y)← f(y,θe) . CRT Encoding
4: ct←Multiply(E(x), E(y)) . Batch Multiply
5: for i = {0, . . . , l} do
6: ct← ct+Kgi(ct) . Cyclic Rotation
7: end for
8: return ct . The element in the first slot is the
desired inner product.
9: end procedure
Dimensionality Reduction: The high computational cost
of face matching over encrypted data depends on two fac-
tors, (1) the high computational cost of one homomorphic
multiplication, and (2) the high dimensionality of the face
Table 1: Security Parameters, Timing and Memory
Security Dim No FHE Parameters Batching No Batchingin bits Time Mem
n t (bits) q Time (ms) Mem Time (ms) Mem(λ) (d) (µs) (KB) Enc Score Dec Total (KB) Enc Score Dec Total (MB)
128
64 0.44 2.0 128 110 40961 0.07 0.17 0.01 0.25 2.0 4.40 5.25 0.01 9.66 0.25
128 0.89 4.0 256 110 40961 0.14 0.38 0.02 0.59 4.0 17.57 21.05 0.02 38.64 1.0
512 3.48 16.0 1024 110 40961 0.58 1.80 0.07 2.45 16.0 280.19 343.81 0.08 624.07 16.5
1024 7.49 32.0 2048 110 40961 1.14 4.02 0.15 5.80 33.0 1135.44 1411.82 0.16 2547.42 66.0
1024 7.49 32.0 4096 110 40961 2.27 8.36 0.30 11.42 66.0 2214.88 2924.75 0.33 5139.97 131.0
192
64 0.44 2.0 128 77 40961 0.07 0.17 0.01 0.25 2.0 4.38 5.25 0.01 9.64 0.25
128 0.89 4.0 256 77 40961 0.15 0.39 0.02 0.55 4.0 17.24 21.07 0.02 38.33 1.0
512 3.48 16.0 1024 77 40961 0.58 1.85 0.07 2.50 16.0 274.11 343.60 0.08 617.79 16.5
1024 7.49 32.0 2048 77 40961 1.17 4.03 0.15 5.35 33.0 1134.22 1410.99 0.16 2545.38 66.0
1024 7.49 32.0 4096 77 40961 2.33 8.91 0.30 11.54 66.0 2214.96 2889.39 0.33 5104.68 131.0
templates. While the former is addressed to an extent by
the batching scheme, there are further avenues for mitigat-
ing the computational burden by reducing the dimensional-
ity of the face template. While a variety of dimensionality
reduction algorithms exist (ISOMAP [45], LLE [38], ran-
dom projections [8] etc.), we consider classical Principal
Component Analysis based dimensionality reduction as an
illustrative example.
Key Switching: In a practical deployment of face recog-
nition systems, it is natural to consider the scenario where
each user utilizes their own set of public encryption (θce) and
private decryption (θcd) keys respectively. This results in a
scenario where face templates encrypted through one set of
encryption keys have to be re-encrypted through another set
of encryption keys without decrypting the template. This
key-switching operation is supported by the FV scheme and
is similar to the multiplication operation in Section 3.3.
3.5. Security Analysis:
The proposed system has three sources of attack, (1) the
client device, (2) the communication channel between the
client and the database, and (3) the database itself. The
security of the client device is of paramount importance,
since the device stores the private decryption key and is
also the source of the raw facial images and the extracted
facial features. We assume the “honest-but-curious” secu-
rity model where all the parties honestly follow the protocol
and learn nothing beyond their own outputs. Under this se-
curity model, the communication channel is secure from a
malicious attacker, since the encrypted facial template can-
not be decrypted without access to the secret key. Similarly
the facial database itself, which consists of the user’s iden-
tity label and encrypted facial templates, is secure without
the access to the secret decryption keys.
4. Experiments
The goal of this paper is to explore the practicality and
efficacy of using fully homomorphic encryption for the pur-
pose of face matching over encrypted data. For our exper-
imentation, we consider two different state-of-the-art deep
neural network based face representations, namely, FaceNet
[39] and SphereFace [23] with 128 and 512 (or 1024) di-
mensional features, respectively.
We evaluate these representations over multiple datasets
of varying complexity. Specifically, we consider the fol-
lowing datasets (1) LFW [17] consisting of 13,233 face
images of 5,749 subjects, downloaded from the web. These
images exhibit limited variations in pose, illumination, and
expression, (2) IJB-A [20]: The IARPA Janus Benchmark-
A (IJB-A) dataset consisting of 500 subjects with a to-
tal of 25,813 images (5,399 still images and 20,414 video
frames). This is a challenging dataset exhibiting i) full pose
variation, ii) a mix of images and videos, and iii) wider geo-
graphical variation of subjects, (3) IJB-B [50]: The IARPA
Janus Benchmark-B (IJB-B) dataset consists of 1,845 sub-
jects with a total of 76,824 images (21,798 still images
and 55,026 video frames from 7,011 videos). This dataset
is a larger superset of the IJB-A dataset, with more sub-
jects and greater facial appearance variations, and (4) CA-
SIA [51]: A large collection of labeled images downloaded
from the web (based on names of famous personalities) typ-
ically used for training deep neural networks. It consists of
494,414 images across 10,575 subjects, with an average of
about 500 face images per subject. This dataset was used to
train the FaceNet and SphereFace representations.
4.1. Implementation Details
Our implementation is based on the NTL C++ Library
[40]. For all experiments, we used a machine with a 4-core
Intel i5-6400 processor running at 2.7 GHz. All of our ex-
periments were run in a single-threaded environment. Be-
fore we perform face matching experiments it is crucial to
determine the parameters necessary for security and correct-
ness of the face matching process. For a given desired level
of security, Table 1 shows the effect of the different param-
eter settings (n, q and t) and the dimensionality of the facial
features on the computational complexity of face matching
Table 2: Face Recognition Accuracy (TAR @ FAR in %)
Dataset Method 128-D FaceNet 512-D SphereFace 64-D PCA FaceNet 64-D PCA SphereFace0.01% 0.1% 1% 0.01% 0.1% 1% 0.01% 0.1% 1% 0.01% 0.1% 1%
LFW
No FHE 84.06 94.56 98.65 90.49 96.74 99.11 83.99 94.64 98.73 88.41 95.80 98.87
FHE (2.5×10−3) 84.05 94.56 98.65 90.49 96.74 99.11 84.00 94.64 98.72 88.38 95.80 98.87
FHE (1.0×10−2) 83.89 94.53 98.66 90.46 96.73 99.11 83.94 94.62 98.72 88.38 95.80 98.87
FHE (1.0×10−1) 78.82 92.58 98.35 84.78 94.72 98.64 78.18 93.06 98.41 84.32 94.38 98.69
IJB-A
No FHE 23.13 45.92 70.26 7.27 30.40 67.89 20.13 46.07 73.71 6.81 28.92 67.59
FHE (2.5×10−3) 23.12 45.94 70.27 7.27 30.40 67.89 20.08 46.14 73.66 6.81 28.92 67.59
FHE (1.0×10−2) 22.83 45.78 70.17 7.25 30.39 67.66 19.92 46.05 73.81 6.80 28.92 67.45
FHE (1.0×10−1) 19.82 42.74 68.37 7.20 30.00 65.23 17.54 44.02 72.11 6.68 27.43 66.76
IJB-B
No FHE 25.77 48.31 74.47 7.86 31.27 69.83 24.95 47.80 74.58 7.13 29.72 69.79
FHE (2.5×10−3) 25.78 48.28 74.46 7.86 31.27 69.82 25.06 47.78 74.66 6.85 29.70 69.69
FHE (1.0×10−2) 25.71 48.31 74.44 7.80 31.29 69.75 24.90 47.97 74.50 6.86 29.85 69.52
FHE (1.0×10−1) 23.75 46.08 72.87 7.49 30.92 67.45 22.79 45.80 73.12 6.90 29.82 69.55
CASIA
No FHE 70.98 84.70 93.29 86.48 90.81 93.83 70.85 84.76 93.35 82.87 89.07 92.80
FHE (2.5×10−3) 70.98 84.70 93.29 86.47 90.81 93.83 70.94 84.82 93.33 82.78 89.04 92.78
FHE (1.0×10−2) 70.96 84.68 93.28 86.47 90.83 93.81 70.92 84.82 93.32 82.74 89.00 92.79
FHE (1.0×10−1) 70.82 84.66 93.25 83.21 89.49 93.05 70.88 84.79 93.32 78.82 87.29 92.16
over encrypted features. We report a breakdown of the time
taken for each of the steps in the matching process, the total
matching time and the size of the templates. We observe
that the fastest FHE based face matching is admittedly over
1000x slower than matching in the real-domain. Neverthe-
less, batching can offer significant a speed-up (T=0.59ms vs
T=38.64ms for n=256, d=128 and T=11.42ms vs T=624ms
for n=1024, d=512) and memory savings (4 KB vs 1 MB
for n=256, d=128, 16 KB vs 16.5 MB for n=1024, d=512)
over element-wise homomorphic face matching. In com-
parison, the FHE based face matching scheme by Troncoso-
Pastoriza et al. [46] requires ∼12.8 secs per match pair and
48.7 MB for each template for 512-dimensional features.
In contrast, our results, suggest that face matching over en-
crypted templates using the proposed FHE framework can
provide high levels of security, 128 to 192 bits, and real-
time matching over a small database of face templates.
4.2. Homomorphic Face Matching
We report the results of face matching experiments on
benchmark datasets for two different, state-of-the-art face
representations (FaceNet [39] and SphereFace [23]) in Ta-
ble 2. For each of these representations, aligned and nor-
malized face images are propagated through the corre-
sponding neural networks to extract1 facial templates of
128 and 512 dimensions, respectively. We report true ac-
ceptance rate (TAR) at three different operating points of
0.01%, 0.1% and 1.0% false accept rates (FARs). We first
evaluate face matching performance over unencrypted face
1We use publicly available implementations, https://github.
com/davidsandberg/facenet and https://github.com/
wy1iu/sphereface.
templates as a baseline to compare against. Since FHE op-
erates on integer representations of the face templates, we
consider three different quantization schemes for each ele-
ment of the face features, one with a precision of 0.1, 0.01
and another with a precision of 0.0025. We observe that
the performance of the latter scheme, by way of being a
more precise representation of the raw features, is competi-
tive with the performance of the unencrypted features. As a
result, the homomorphic face matching over encrypted fea-
tures can perform as well as matching raw features while
providing template protection, preventing information leak-
age and preserving the privacy of the users. Finally, our ex-
perimental results suggest that even simple PCA based di-
mensionality reduction can perform comparably to the orig-
inal high-dimensional features, while affording significant
homomorphic face matching efficiency.
5. Conclusion
This paper explored the practicality of securing and
matching a database of face templates using fully homo-
morphic encryption. We utilize a batching scheme, that per-
forms multiple homomorphic multiplications in a single op-
eration, and a dimensionality reduction scheme. Our frame-
work affords significant computational efficiencies, requir-
ing 16 KB of memory space per encrypted template and
0.01 secs for matching a pair of such templates. Exper-
imental results over multiple benchmark datasets suggest
that, fully homomorphic encryption could be a viable prac-
tical solution for accurate face matching in the encrypted
domain, and can help prevent information leakage and pre-
serve the privacy of users.
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